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In the recent past the idea of the important role of venture capital firms in providing 
financing for start-up companies has been spread to most countries in Continental 
Europe. This is also due to the fact that it has become widely accepted among academ-
ics as well as politicians that venture capital is playing an important role in the devel-
opment of an economy.1 
The growing degree of acceptance and the growth of venture capital can be best 
observed in Germany. Over the last decade the German venture capital industry has left 
its niche existence and realized high growth rates with regard to funds flowing in. The 
total volume of funds amounted to 12.81 bill. Euro in 1999 and thereby achieved in this 
year with 49.6% one of the highest growth rates throughout the 1990s.2 
According to the US role model the typical venture capitalist is characterized by 
a number of attributes.3 First, venture capitalists furnish companies with ”active” capi-
tal, i.e. besides searching for attractive investments and p roviding them with funding 
they get involved into the management of portfolio. Hence, venture capital is also often 
called ”smart money”. Second, they provide the capital stage-wise over various financ-
ing rounds. Third, for the most part they are organized as closed-end funds which mag-
nifies their desire to invest for only a rather limited period of time and to search for exit 
channels. Fourth, the data on financing in the US venture capital industry highlights the 
                                                 
1  Kortum/Lerner (2000), for instance, show that in the US much of the growth in patenting appears to 
have been spurred by the activities of venture capitalists. 
2  See BVK (2000). 
3  See for an almost classical overview Sahlman (1990).   2
dominance of the use of convertible securities such as convertible debt and convertible 
preferred shares. 
In contrast to Germany the long history of venture capital in the US provides for 
a much broader data base. A growing body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, 
has evolved over the past two decades and is looking into the details and mechanisms of 
the North-American venture capital industry.4 Because of both data availability and 
market dominance the vast majority of studies concentrates on the US and Canadian 
market only. For the German venture capital industry only very few empirical studies 
exist so far, where appropriate data is almost entirely absent.5 
Against this background our study aim, with the collection of proper data, to 
shed further light on specific aspects of the German venture capital market. The study is 
focused on the financial relationship between the venture capitalists and their portfolio 
firms, as well as the use of various financial instruments. Thereby, we focus on the 
above mentioned special characteristic of v enture capital contracts, namely the pre-
dominance of convertible securities. The ultimate goal of our study is to test whether the 
broad implications of the hypotheses developed in the theoretical literature on venture 
capital finance can be confirmed by our data.6 Despite the fact that legal as well as mar-
ket conditions differ significantly,7 this study also addresses the crucial question 
                                                 
4  Rather recently much of the literature has been synthesized in Gompers/Lerner (2000). 
5  See for example Schefczyk (1998); Lessat et al. (1999). 
6  In order to test explicitly each empirical implication of the various theoretical models on venture capi-
tal finance one would need data on the structure of individual venture capital deals. Unfortunately, 
such data is not available so far. 
7  Pfirrmann et al. (1997) provide a comparison of the German and the US venture capital market.   3
whether insights gained from the US market are transferable to the now largest market 
in Continental Europe.8 
In order  to collect the appropriate data we conducted a survey questioning all 
regular members of the German venture capital association (BVK). This data set then 
enables us to pursue our objectives. Therefore, our study does not only shed light on a 
so far empirically neglected research question but also offers a new data set on the f i-
nancial structure of venture capital deals in Germany. Our results suggest that, as a spe-
cial feature of the German venture capital market, public-private partnership agencies 
require significantly lower returns from their investments in portfolio firms. Secondly, 
private and young venture capitalists are the ones which are most likely to follow the 
model of the typical relationship between a US venture capital firm and its investors, 
namely the refinancing of investments by closed-end funds.  
With regard to the financing practices of German venture capitalists, it appears 
that the use of convertible securities is for the most part determined by two broad sets of 
variables. The first set proxies the extent to which the special exit problem in venture 
capital finance reinforces traditional control and moral hazard problems. The second set 
of variables tries to capture the consequences of the specific refinancing situation of 
German venture capitalists for the design of financial contracts. Broadly speaking, both 
kinds of variables indicate that it is the severity of agency problems in venture capital 
finance that is calling for the use of convertible securities. Regarding the importance of 
convertible securities relative to traditional debt-equity financing, our second result con-
                                                 
8  The largest venture capital market in Europe is the UK, followed by Germany and France. For details  
 see BVK (2000).   4
firms by and large the explanations offered in the theoretical literature. Namely, that the 
additional features of convertible securities such as state contingent p ayoff functions 
(milestones) and the de-coupling of the payoff from the control problem are, relative to 
debt-equity mixes, much more apt to address the control and incentive problems at the 
exit stage of a venture capital relationship. 
The last important  finding to be mentioned indicates that the use of a financing 
instrument that is very specific to the German market, i.e. silent partnerships, can be 
explained by return requirements and the anticipated proportion of buy-backs, underlin-
ing the role of public-private partnership agencies in Germany. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline the theoretical 
literature that analyzes the factors determining the choice of financial instruments in 
venture capital contracts. For the most part these papers focus on the widespread use of 
convertible securities. In section 3 our data base is discussed. Section 4 serves to present 
the descriptive analysis of our data. In section 5 we use statistical and econometric tech-
niques to analyze these data and to identify empirically the factors determining financial 
choices in the German venture capital industry. In section 6 we provide a brief sum-
mary.   5
2  Theoretical Background 
With perfect capital markets, i.e. in the absence of information costs, bankruptcy costs, 
and taxes, the famous irrelevance result of Miller and Modigliani (1958) holds. Finan-
cial structure does not have any impact on firm and investment value. In the real world 
the assumptions of the Miller/Modigliani world are, however, often violated in a num-
ber of ways. Especially, in high-tech start-ups informational asymmetries and bank-
ruptcy costs play an important role. Therefore, on the one hand the possibility of raising 
external capital may be precluded entirely,9 and on the other hand the financial structure 
can be used to improve the value of firms and investment projects.10 Financial econo-
mists argue that specialized intermediaries, such as venture capitalists, can address these 
imperfections in a better way than e.g. banks. Venture capitalists invest in the necessary 
resources and skills to effectively select firms and to monitor them after the investment 
has been made. The most important mechanisms that venture capitalists use to monitor 
their portfolio firms are screening mechanisms ( Chan (1983)), control rights e.g. the 
right to fire the founder (Hellmann (1998), Chan et al. (1990)), and the staging of the 
investment (Bergemann and Hege (1998)).  
However, it is not only the non-monetary aspects of venture capital that are critical to its 
success. Most notably the existence of incentive problems related to asymmetric infor-
mation and control, are considered to be the reason for the observed complexity of f i-
nancial contracts. The most remarkable feature of financial structure in the North-
American venture capital industry is the unusually broad reliance on convertible securi-
                                                 
9  See e.g. Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984). 
10  See e.g. Myers and Majluf (1984).   6
ties. Various empirical studies have shown that the percentage of venture capital deals 
using some sort of convertible securities ranges from 20.9 to 94.5 percent depending on 
the analyzed data set.11 These observations have led researchers to think about potential 
determinants of financial structure in the venture capital industry, especially with regard 
to the use of convertible securities.  
Compared to traditional financial instruments such as loans, bonds, and equity converti-
ble securities exhibit different structures and economic effects. Convertible securities, 
i.e. convertible preferred shares and convertible debt, are a mixture of debt and equity 
and an ex-ante specified call option.12 For instance, convertible preferred shares depict a 
combination of preference shares, which entitle the holder to a fixed claim consisting of 
the face value of preference shares plus accumulated dividends, and a call option on 
common s tocks of the firm.13 This implies that in contrast to debt and equity financing 
the control and payoff mechanisms associated with convertible securities give room for 
much more flexibility, e.g. through different state contingencies. 
Starting from a set of  comparable assumptions, existing theoretical research on 
the design of financial contracts is based on different aspects of agency theory. These 
studies can be separated into two broad categories. On the one hand, these models look 
into the design of optimal incentives during the implementation of the project. On the 
other hand there are models that focus on the fact that venture capitalists typically invest 
                                                 
11  See e.g. Trester (1998); Kaplan/Stromberg (1999); Cumming (2000). 
12  We concentrate in the following on these most widely used two main types of convertible securities. 
13  The execution of the call option can be either voluntary or automatic if there are verifiable events (e.g. 
a ratchet).   7
in their portfolio companies only for a limited period of time.14 Therefore, conflicts of 
interest may arise between the two parties over when and how the exit of the venture 
capitalist should take place. These problems can be addressed ex-ante through the de-
sign of the financial contract. 
In all these models, moral hazard problems play the decisive role. Moral hazard 
occurs when the actions of the agent cannot be observed by the principal or cannot be 
verified by third parties (e.g. courts). In order to achieve the first-best result (or at least a 
second-best solution) the agent has to be induced – via pecuniary incentives – to act in 
the interest of the principal. The main idea behind all theoretical analyses in venture 
capital finance is that in young and fast growing firms  a multiple of such moral hazard 
problems (and sometimes adverse selection problems, too) exist at the same time, and in 
a variety of forms. These extended moral hazard problems are arguably the reasons for 
the observed complexity of contracts and the use of highly flexible instruments such as 
convertible securities.15 We now discuss the two classes of models in more detail. 
                                                 
14  There are various reasons for investing only for a limited period of time. The most obvious one is that 
venture capital firms often refinance themselves via closed-end funds. Another reason is that venture 
capital firms both want and have to signal the success of their investments. This can only be done 
credibly if the venture capital firms cashes in its initial investment after a while. Additionally, after a 
certain period of time, initial investments do no longer fit into the risk profile of the venture capital 
firm (e.g. when the venture evolves from a startup firm to a more mature investment). 
15  If both sides of the relationship are assumed to be risk neutral, as is the case in almost all models on 
venture capital finance, the optimal solution to the traditional one-sided moral hazard is known to be 
a straight debt contract. This result comes out of the seminal paper by Harris/Raviv (1979). However, 
if the agent is risk averse then some sort of equity finance should be used.   8
2.1  Incentives during project implementation 
The first class of models focuses on the implementation period of the portfolio firm’s 
project. Thereby, a number of different situations in which the use of convertible securi-
ties seem to be most promising has been singled out. We will outline the most promi-
nent arguments analyzed in the literature.  
Typically, venture capitalists are actively involved into the management of the 
portfolio firm. Hence, a two-sided  moral hazard problem (i.e. the entrepreneur as well 
as the venture capitalist have to be induced to undertake effort) may arise. Due to the 
disutility of effort the entrepreneur as well as the venture capitalist may not undertake 
first-best actions in order to enhance the success probability of the project. Recently, it 
has been shown that such double moral hazard problems can be better addressed by 
convertible securities than by equity finance.16 The more flexible financial security (i.e. 
convertibles) allows to induce optimal effort on the part of both agents. The basic intui-
tion is that on the one hand, due to the fixed repayment part of the convertible security, 
the entrepreneur has an incentive to reach, via own effort, payoffs above the fixed r e-
payment level. On the other hand, due to the conversion option, the venture capitalist 
has a more pronounced incentive to undertake effort with convertibles than with equity 
finance. The superiority of convertible securities is all the more justified the fiercer the 
effort problem, and the higher the desired return of the venture capitalist relative to the 
return of the entire project.17 That is, we should expect a heavier reliance on convertible 
securities (relative to other financial instruments), first when venture capitalists and e n-
                                                 
16  See Repullo/Suarez (1998) and Casamatta (1999).   9
trepreneurs are reaching for high goals, i.e. an initial public offering (IPO), second when 
the management resources of the venture capitalist are scarce, i.e. a high number of 
portfolio firms, and third a high expected rate of return of the venture capitalist. 
A different situation where flexible financial instruments such as convertible s e-
curities are again superior to debt-equity contracts arises when the entrepreneur is p o-
tentially engaged in  window dressing. When capital contributions are s taged, entrepre-
neurs have an incentive to create potentially unjustified positive signals about the suc-
cess probability of their project in order to improve their refunding. However, if the 
difference in returns across possible states is very large, e.g. i f an IPO is regarded as a 
possible exit option, convertible securities prove to be superior to debt-equity contracts. 
This is due to the fact that the entrepreneur, by manipulating signals, runs the risk that 
the venture capitalist exercises his conversion option thus allowing him to buy under-
priced equity when the development of the firm is most favorable.18 Consequently, we 
expect a more frequent use of convertible securities if capital contributions are staged, 
i.e. in startup situations,19 and if firm value rises in the anticipated outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                               
17  Note that there is no straight forward correlation between the investment amount, required returns 
relative to expected project returns and the investment stage. Hence, with regard to this aspect, we get 
no clear prediction about the severity of agency problems in any specific investment stage. 
18  See on this argument Cornelli/Oved (1997). 
19  In startup situations investment sums are typically lower than in expansion financing, see e.g. Murray 
(1999). Hence capital staging is much more common in startup financing.   10
Venture capitalists aim at IPOs not only in order to realize high returns but also to build 
up a reputation for superior venture selection and assistance.20 Thereby, with his effort 
decision the entrepreneur influences both the success probability of the firm and also the 
expected  reputational gains  of the venture capitalist. In a way, the moral hazard prob-
lem is extended to a second dimension. In this situation, once again, convertible securi-
ties prove to have superior incentive properties compared to debt-equity contracts when 
the difference in monetary returns across possible states is large.21 Hence, we expect to 
observe a more frequent use of convertibles the more often the venture capitalist aims at 
an IPO. 
The last justification for the use of convertibles to be mentioned in this subsec-
tion argues that convertible securities are also capable of solving simultaneously  moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems.22 The hypothesis states that under certain 
conditions convertible debt contracts are superior to debt-equity contracts because they 
allow to distinguish between low and high quality entrepreneurs and, at the same time, 
to induce them not to pursue too risky project strategies. Therefore, we expect venture 
capitalists to fall back on convertible securities more often the less established the track 
record of the entrepreneur, and the higher the discretion of the entrepreneur in choosing 
more or less risky implementation strategies. Both arguments point into the direction of 
startup and early stage financing situations. 
                                                 
20  See e.g. Black/Gilson (1999); Gompers/Lerner (2000) p. 26. 
21  See for details Bascha (2000). 
22  See e.g. Gompers (1993).   11
2.2  Exit models 
The second class of models is based on the exit problem and the associated conflict of 
interest between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. The principal problem at 
the exit stage consists in the inability of the two parties to verify outcomes against a 
third neutral party, e.g. a court, if they have different opinions about how and when the 
venture capitalist should reacquire the liquidity of his investment. While certain actions 
or outcomes might be observable, meaning that investors know what the entrepreneur 
did, the inability to write and enforce contracts that are contingent on particular events 
makes external financing costly. Many of the models of ownership (Grossman and Hart 
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)) and financing choice (Hart and Moore (1998)) de-
pend on this assumption of incomplete contracting. In the context of venture capital 
financing an efficient solution of the exit problem is vital both for the development of 
the whole venture capital market (Black and Gilson (1998)) and for the success of the 
single investment. So far two models have addressed this topic. 
First Bascha and Walz (2000) have highlighted the problem of an efficient choice b e-
tween an IPO and a trade sale as possible exit channels. Generally, the entrepreneur is 
very much interested in the control over his firm not only during the implementation 
phase but also after the venture capitalist’s exit as his independence is one of the major 
reasons  for him to found his firm. Therefore, he prefers either an initial public offering 
or a trade sale as exit channel, depending on whether, in a trade sale, he receives a mo-
netary compensation for his preference for control. The venture capitalist, on the other 
side, benefits from a strong reputation effect when a successful firm goes public. If, 
however, the firm turns out to be flying rather low, the venture capitalist might prefer an 
alternative exit channel, resulting in a possible conflict of interest about the appropriate   12
ate exit channel. Convertible securities prove to be financial instruments which are suf-
ficiently flexible, so as to enable the entrepreneur to profit from his control preference, 
and to allow for the optimal exit strategy to be chosen.23 Therefore, we would expect 
more convertible securities to be used if the venture capitalists takes into account the 
possibility of an initial public offering as a viable exit channel.  
A related argument for the use of convertible securities can be derived f rom the 
problem of efficient allocation of control in the bargaining situation of a trade sale (Ber-
glöf (1994)). Because of control benefits of the entrepreneur and the possibility of asset 
stripping by the potential buyer in bad states of nature, the entrepreneur should be the 
bargaining partner in sales negotiations only in good states of nature, and the venture 
capitalist in bad states of nature. This state contingent allocation of control can a lways 
be achieved by setting a debt value such that the entrepreneur will always fail on debt 
repayment in the bad state of nature. Convertible debt then proves to be superior to 
debt-equity when, in the good state of nature, the potential buyer brings along efficiency 
enhancements, say because of his management expertise or synergy effects with his 
established business.  
The crucial assumption behind this result is that the venture capitalist retains his 
ownership in the acquired firm in order to cash in the efficiency enhancements brought 
about by the buyer of the firm. However, if in a trade sale the venture capitalist sells 
along with the entrepreneur, the argument supporting the positive relationship between 
use of convertibles and frequency of trade sales vanishes. Instead, one would expect the 
use of a mixture of traditional instruments such as debt and equity. 
                                                 
23  See for details Bascha/Walz (2000).   13
To sum up, the common features of all these models are that convertible securi-
ties should be used more often the more pronounced the incentive problems are, i.e. the 
aspiration of high goals such as IPOs, scarce management resources of the venture capi-
talist, high monetary return requirements, and a high discretion of the entrepreneur who 
could either manipulate signals or choose too risky projects. With regard to the severity 
of incentive problems in the investment stage, the theoretical predictions are not straight 
forward, but point in the direction of startup financing where the probability of failure is 
very high, entrepreneurs have an unproven track record and high a managerial discre-
tion in choosing the risk profile of the R&D strategy. Also, the result that the use of 
convertibles helps to maximize returns in the case of a trade sale is quite specific to the 
assumptions of the model. 
 
3  The Data 
The objective of our research is twofold as we wish to gain detailed insights into the 
financial instruments used in the German venture capital industry, and to analyze the 
determinants of the financial architecture. Since for our purpose no public data sources 
were available we had to collect the necessary d ata first. We conducted a full survey 
including all venture capital firms by sending a questionnaire to all regular members of 
the German Venture Capital Association (BVK). Rather than asking for data on the i n-
dividual investments of the venture capital firm, which would have caused both selec-
tion problems and very poor participation rates, our questions targeted aggregate finan-
cial behavior of the venture capital firms. We distinguished two sets of questions. First, 
we were interested in some general characteristics like age and number of portfolio   14
firms, type of fund organization used (closed funds), the venture capitalists’ required 
return relative to market average (subjective appraisal), and percentages of the venture 
capitalists’ investments in different types of portfolio firms (startup or expansion 
phase). Second, we asked for the relative frequencies of the various financial instru-
ments in the venture capitalists’ investments as well as for the relative importance of 
different expected exit channels.  
We sent the questionnaire to all 121 regular members of the BVK (as of January 
1
st, 2000). In order to increase participation rates we enclosed a pre-paid back-envelope 
and after four weeks we initiated a second round with letters to non-responding venture 
capital firms. We ended up with an overall response rate of 59.5%. The 72 responses 
included 60 (at least partially) answered questionnaires and 12 negative replies. This left 
us with an effective particpitaion rate of 49.6%. We completed our data base by collect-
ing general data for all non-responding venture capital firms via the internet, relying on 
the company information given on the webpage of the BVK and the respective venture 
capital firms. We looked for the number of financed portfolio firms, the age of the ven-
ture capitalist and his status (whether there was an influence of public authorities or 
not). This data is used later on to test for selection bias in our sample. 
 
4  Descriptive Analysis 
The first of our main objectives is to describe the financial behavior of venture capital 
firms in the German private equity market. Therefore, we focus on the use of different 
financial instruments. Against this background, it is crucial to consider the specific a s-
pects of the German commercial law. While portfolio firms organized as public corpo-  15
rations can rely on equity and convertible securities,24 the law entails a special treatment 
for portfolio firms organized as private limited companies. While they are not a llowed 
to use convertible debt,25 they can make use of equity-type instruments (partnership 
interests). Other allowed specific financial instruments like participating certificates do 
not fall into one of our broad categories. In our questionnaire, these instruments are i n-
cluded in the category ”other financial instruments”. Silent partnerships, a debt-like 
financing instrument, loans and proprietors’ loans are independent of the legal form. 
We transformed these instruments into the following financial categories and 
asked for their relative frequencies in the contracts of the respective venture capital 
firm: i) pure equity ii) convertible securities iii) debt-equity mix iv) silent partnerships 
v) silent partnerships and debt vi) other instruments. Results are presented in Table 1.26 
 
Table 1: Financial instruments used (in percentage points) 
  Equity 
only 
Debt- 
Equity 
Mix 
Convertible 
Securities 
Silent 
Partner-
ships 
Silent 
Partner-
ships 
+ Debt 
Other 
Financial 
Instruments 
Mean  26.6  14.4  10.6  33.1  5.6  10.7 
Median  20  0  0  15  0  0 
Maximum  100  100  90  100  88  90 
Minimum  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 
                                                 
24  See §§ 192 ff Akt Gesetz. 
25  See §§ 238 HGB. 
26  We constructed these categories with a certain degree of freedom in order to make allowances for the 
diversity of contractual arrangements. For example, we asked for the average percentage of contracts 
where convertibles were present, i.e. convertibles only and combinations with other instruments.   16
As can be seen from  Table 1 , the instrument of silent partnerships is the most 
widely used in the German venture capital industry, followed by pure equity finance, 
debt-equity mix and convertibles. Overall we obtain a relation  of equity to non-equity 
and other financing instruments of about 51% to 49%. Statistics provided by BVK 
(2000) about the financing of new investments in 1999 report this relation 47% to 50%. 
The min. and max. values of table 1 already gives us a first hint that venture ca-
pital firms differ in their use of the various instruments. This suspicion is confirmed 
when looking at the data in more detail. The financial instruments used by the majority 
of firms are pure equity (70%) and silent partnerships (63%). H owever, there is always 
a large number of firms that do not use the respective financial instrument at all.27 This 
is especially true for the case of convertible securities (57.41%) and debt-equity mixes 
(66.67%), where even the majority of firms do not apply them. Therefore, in the case of 
convertible securities a quite different picture emerges compared with the North-
American venture capital industry, where the most part of venture capital contracts are 
based upon convertibles.28  Figure 1  depicts the cumulative distributions of pure equity 
and convertible securities. 
                                                 
27  This special feature of the data indicates that there might be a threshold effect for the use of the con-
sidered financial instrument. We will take this possibility into account by using the Tobit model in 
our econometric analysis in section 5.2. 
28  See e.g. Trester (1998), Kaplan/Stromberg (1999). In fact a new empirical study by Cumming (2000) 
shows that the use of convertibles is also not that extensive in the Canadian as in the US market.   17
Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of financial instruments across venture capital firms 
 
As already pointed out in the previous section, the exit decision is a crucial as-
pect for venture capitalists. Therefore, we will have to investigate the relative impor-
tance of different exit channels. The results in  Table 2 reflect the responses to our ques-
tion: What is the expected percentage of an IPO, trade sale, buy-back, liquidation or 
other alternative as an exit channel from your portfolio companies? This is confronted 
with the realized values as of 1999.29 
 
 
 
Table 2: Expected Versus Realized Exit Channels (in percentage points) 
  IPO  Trade Sale  Buy-Back  Liquidation  Other 
Realized:  
As of 1999 
 
10.1 
 
15.16 
 
35.74 
 
29.78 
 
9.22 
Expected: 
Mean 
 
27.89 
 
25.23 
 
24.78 
 
9.64 
 
12.4 
                                                 
29  See BVK (2000). 
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Maximum  70  100  100  70  100 
Minimum  0  0  0  0  0 
 
Expectations are in some contrast with the historical distribution of exit channels 
in 1999. As venture capitalists like to see IPOs and trade sales as the role model for an 
exit, they may have a tendency to anticipate a moving from buy-backs to trade sales and 
especially IPOs. It is hard to assess, whether these expectations are justified in the sense 
that with the successful establishment of the German stock-exchange’s high-technology 
segment (Neuer Markt), the relative importance of IPOs will increase in the future. 
Also, on the side of the entrepreneurs this could reflect a change in their mentality. Ger-
man entrepreneurs are said to have a strong preference for control over their firms and 
hence tend to favor a buy-back in order to remain independent. Due to the success story 
of the ”Neuer Markt” this might be changing now.30 The important point we want to 
stress here is that at the contracting stage parties are relying mostly on their expectations 
in order to structure their financial relationship. A more general problem concerns the 
reporting of liquidations. Given the high risk of failure in this market and the historical 
29.78%, we feel that our number of about 10% is too low and hence expectations are 
too optimistic. We will take this problem into account in the next section. 
From our theoretical considerations it follows that, the degree of uncertainty and 
risk involved might b e crucial. Therefore, the stage of investment is potentially decisive 
for the financial structure. We asked for the percentage of portfolio firms being in the 
startup or expansion phase. It turns out that the average of the share of portfolio firms in 
                                                 
30  The attitudes of both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs towards an IPO very much vary over time 
as there are times of hot and cold issue markets. See Gompers/Lerner (2000), chapter 11.   19
the startup stage is 36.9%, whereas it amounts to 59.8% for the expansion period.31 Gi-
ven the recent trend to invest in  .com startups, these figures are not that far from the 
1999 figures of the BVK reporting 31.2% and 44.8% respectively. 
Finally, we collected  some general data, reflecting age and status of the venture 
capitalist as well as the number of firms in their portfolios. With respect to the status of 
the venture capitalist we aimed at capturing an important feature of the German market. 
Using the membership list of the BVK we characterize a venture capitalist as being pub-
lic if the ownership structure indicates that there might be an influence of public 
authorities either directly or indirectly.32 We otherwise define the respective venture 
capitalist as being private. In the first case we set the PUBLIC variable equal to 1 and in 
the second case equal to 0. We thus find 43% of venture capitalists to be public. This 
corresponds very well to the findings of Schefczyk (2000) where it is shown that 38% 
of all venture capital firms were either public co-investment companies (e.g. KFW and 
TBG), investment companies for medium-sized firms (Mittelständische 
Beteiligungsgesellschaften) or saving/regional banks (Sparkassen, Landesbanken). 
The data on the variable AGE reflects the fact that the majority of venture capi-
tal firms is rather young (50% of the firms have been established in the last decade). 
Only few old firms exist and the mean age is 14.4 years, which mirrors the youth of the 
German market.33  Figure 2  additionally shows the size profile of the venture capitalists 
                                                 
31  The remaining part (the two figures do not add up to 100 percent) is in other phases of the investment 
cycle, e.g. seed, turnaround and buyout stages. 
32  Banks or finance institutes mainly controlled by public authorities are very often interested in the 
promotion of regional business structures and employment. 
33  With respect to the characterization of very old firms one has to be careful. First, there are some inter-
national players, that have been engaged in the German market for a typically much shorter time. Se-
cond, some firms have been active in another industry before entering the venture capital business.   20
portfolios. This distribution is highly skewed because only a few venture capitalists are 
managing a large number of portfolio firms. There are 11 venture capitalists having i n-
vested in 100 or more portfolio companies, of which are 8 public and 3 private. This 
highlights once again the important role of public companies in the German market. 
 
Figure 2: Age of venture capitalists and number of firms in their portfolio 
 
 
5  Determinants of (Financial) Structures in the German Venture Capital 
Industry 
In this section we turn to our second goal, namely the analysis of the financial contract 
design between venture capitalists and portfolio firms. 
 
5.1  General structure 
In order to obtain information about return claims we asked whether the venture capital-
ist’s return claim is below, above, or at the industry’s average. These self-assessed or-
derings do not serve to measure proven performance but intend to reflect the available 
information at the contracting stage. Since the RETURN variable is a qualitative one 
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with three categories we estimate an ordered probit model with AGE, PUBLIC and the 
NUMBER of portfolio firms as explanatory variables. Results are displayed in  Table 3. 
We find a negative and highly  significant effect of PUBLIC on the relative return 
claims. The effects of the other variables are, however, insignificant.34 That is, our data 
shows a significant difference between private and public venture capitalists in the sense 
that public firms have lower return claims than private ones. 
 
Table 3: Ordered Probit Estimates for Relative Return Claims 
Dependent Variable RETURN 
Explanatory Variable  Estimated Coefficient  P-Value 
PUBLIC   -2.133051  0.0000 
NUMBER  0.000300  0.7744 
AGE  -0.000712  0.9656 
Number of observations: 59, Pseudo-R
2 =0.267. 
                                                 
34  The p-value represents, broadly speaking, the probability that the null of b=0 is true. Hence, e.g. for a 
p-value of 0.05 the estimated influence of a certain parameter is said to be significant at a 5% level.   22
Our theoretical discussion showed the exit problem to be a decisive factor in the 
design of financial structure. This exit problem is aggravated if the venture capital firm 
itself is financed via a closed-end fund. The respective information is the binary variable 
CLOSED, equal to 1 if the form of closed-end funds is used and 0 otherwise. From an 
economic point of view, closed-end funds can reduce the agency problems between the 
venture capital firm and the investor.  For example, venture capitalists do not want to 
terminate their investments in poorly performing firms in due time because of the asso-
ciated reputation losses. Therefore, one would expect this organizational form to be 
most common with private and young venture capitalists investing mainly in startup 
companies, where agency problems of this kind are potentially the highest. This is con-
firmed by the data. A binary probit estimation, see  Table 4  reveals that PUBLIC and 
AGE have a significant impact on the use of closed-end funds. That is, in line with 
Zemke (1995) venture capitalists being private, young are most likely to follow the t y-
pical relationship between a North-American venture capital firm and its investors. 
 
Table 4: Binary Probit Estimation for the Use of Closed-End Funds 
Dependent Variable CLOSED 
Explanatory Variable  Estimated Coefficient  P-Value 
CONST  0.525984  0.3042 
PUBLIC  -1.361245  0.0031 
AGE  -0.060653  0.0560 
STARTUP  0.004033  0.5447 
NUMBER  -0.001159  0.6881 
Number of observations: 57, Mc-Fadden R
2= 0.28 
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The last problem to be addressed in this section concerns the question of whether 
the results of our survey are representative for the whole German venture capital indus-
try. As our data base contains information on the variables AGE,  NUMBER and 
PUBLIC for all responding as well as non-responding venture capitalists, we are able to 
test for a selection bias in our data. For this purpose we run a binary probit estimation 
for RESPONSE, which takes the value 1 if a response occurred and 0  otherwise. As 
summarized in  Table 5 the explanatory power of AGE and NUMBER is very low. Only 
for the status of the venture capital firms it turns out that the probability for answering 
to the questionnaire is slightly higher for public firms at a 5% level. Additionally, the 
Mc-Fadden R
2 for this estimation is very low. Hence, with regard to the generalizability 
of our results we consider the possibility of a selection bias only as a minor problem. 
 
Table 5: Estimates for Selection Bias 
Dependent Variable RESPONSE 
Explanatory Variable  Estimated Coefficient  P-Value 
CONST  0.611769  0.0116 
PUBLIC  0.738647  0.0300 
AGE  0.001171  0.5905 
NUMBER  -0.014514  0.1672 
Number of observations: 87, Mc-Fadden R
2= 0.1 
5.2  Financial Structure 
Since our focus is on financial  instruments, and especially convertible securities, we 
now investigate the extent to which they are used. For that purpose we use for the most 
part of our estimations the censored regression model, or the Tobit model. The necessity 
for this methodology is  born of the special characteristic of our data, namely that there 
is always a large number of venture capital firms in our sample that do not use the re-  24
spective financial instrument. This feature destroys the linearity assumption so that the 
usual linear r egression model is inappropriate. Technically speaking, the sampling dis-
tributions are a mixture of discrete and continuous distributions. The econometrically 
adequate method to address this problem is to use the following Tobit model,35 
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whereby (1) is the latent variable regression model of the dependent variable. There, 
*
i y  
is the solution of a decision problem without a boundary constraint that allows only for 
non-negative solutions. What does this mean in our context? Venture capital contracts 
are designed to solve agency problems of a certain extent, with the help of specific f i-
nancial instruments. Theoretical considerations have shown that as the severity of 
agency problems increases, one has to switch from traditional financing instruments like 
debt and equity to more complicated ones. In other words, there seems to be a certain 
threshold of agency problems from then on one uses high incentive instruments like 
convertible securities. Therefore, if one tries to estimate the determinants of the use of a 
certain financial instrument, the solution to the properly specified problem can be d e-
fined by (2), which describes the transformation rule of the original variable into the 
new random variable  yi  . 
'
i x  denotes the vector of explanatory variables that influence 
the degree of agency problems faced by each venture capitalist. 
                                                 
35  See e.g. Amemiya (1985), chapter 10.   25
In the set of explanatory variables we include IPO (+), TRADE SALE (+,-), 
BUY-BACK (-), EXPANSION (+,-), CLOSED (+), RETHIGH (+), RETMEAN (+,-), 
with the signs in the brackets representing our expectations of the variables’ influence 
on the perceived extent of agency problems. As one can see, we thereby break down the 
RETURN variable into separate binary variables RETHIGH, RETMEAN, RETLOW 
which take the value of 1 if the answer in the questionnaire occurred in the respective 
category and 0 otherwise.36 We utilize AGE and NUMBER as additional control vari-
ables. Hence, we choose to disregard LIQUIDATION,  STARTUP, RETLOW, and 
PUBLIC as explanatory variables. This is because the LIQUIDATION, STARTUP, and 
RETLOW are residual variables for the exit, stage, and return questions. With regard to 
PUBLIC a high correlation with RETURN has occurred in  Table 3. Hence, only one of 
them should be included in the same set of explanatory variables. 
The first step is a  Tobit analysis (based on the standard normal distribution) of 
CS, which denotes the importance of convertible securities in percentage points given as 
an average over all contracts of a single venture capitalist. Results are stated in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Tobit Estimation on the Use of Convertible Securities 
Dependent Variable CS 
Explanatory Variable  Estimated Coefficient  P-Value 
CONST  -22.00753  0.1953 
IPO  0.470047  0.0089 
TRADE SALE  -0.389272  0.0897 
                                                 
36  This avoids the problematic interpretation of an ordinal explanatory variable on the right hand side. 
See Greene (1990), p. 234 for the problem of threshold effects in this context.   26
BUY-BACK  -0.165778  0.4800 
EXPANSION  -0.073275  0.5527 
CLOSED  7.966538  0.3489 
RETHIGH  46.74868  0.0015 
RETMEAN  22.52156  0.0451 
AGE  1.104376  0.0182 
NUMBER  -0.149694  0.2541 
Number of observations: 47, adjusted R
2=0.51 
 
All significant agency variables can be interpreted in line with our theoretical 
considerations. Most importantly the higher the expected amount of IPOs, the more 
pressing is the exit problem and the higher the effort required from both agents. T his 
effect is also very robust against the variation of the assumed underlying distribution 
function. In a regression that controls for robust standard errors and covariance (Hu-
ber/White) IPO is the only variable that remains significant at the 5% level. 
The negative influence of TRADE SALE is only significant at the 10% level. 
This finding could be interpreted as slight evidence for the argument that the expected 
frequency of IPOs and trade sales have different effects on the anticipated severity of 
agency problems calling for a more or less extensive use of convertible securities. We 
will investigate this argument in the next estimation on the relation between convertible 
securities and debt/equity financing in greater detail.  
Further, it turns out that v enture capital firms with high return claims use con-
vertible securities, with their flexible incentive and control mechanisms, significantly 
more often. This result favors on the one side the double moral hazard models and indi-
cates on the other side that public-private partnership agencies face a lower pressure to   27
solve agency problems because of their moderate return requirements. We regard this as 
a major explanation for the quantitatively lower importance of convertibles in Germany. 
The last significant variable AGE can also be interpreted in the light of the special struc-
ture of the German venture capital market. As a matter of fact older venture capitalists 
have more experience with regard to this special kind of financial instrument. Addition-
ally, the international players on the German market are both much older than originally 
German venture capital firms and much more familiar with convertibles. 
For the most part the theoretical models explain the superiority of convertible 
securities over traditional financing instruments such as debt-equity mixes as a bench-
mark case. Though debt-equity mixes have a certain flexibility in payoff structures, and 
include the possibility of a control change, the additional features of convertible securi-
ties such as state contingent payoff functions (milestones) and the de-coupling of the 
payoff from the control problem are much more apt to deal with the complexity of  a-
gency problems in venture capital finance. For example, the conversion option can 
either widen the spread in payoffs leading to improved incentives or transfer control 
rights even in good states of nature. Both effects are not available under debt-equity 
mixes. However, since these instruments are quite closely interrelated, it is sensible to 
compare them w ith each other and to analyze the features making one or the other more 
attractive. For that reason we compute the difference between the two variables con-
vertible securities (CS) and debt-equity mixes (DE) and call this new variable CSDE. 
As this new variable ranges from  -100% to +100% the problem with a large number of 
zero observations at the sides of the distribution is avoided. Hence, we are able to per-
form an ordinary-least-squares regression. The results are reported in Table 7. 
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Table 7:Ordinary-Least-Squares Estimation for the Difference between Convertibles 
and Debt-Equity Mix 
Dependent Variable CSDE 
Explanatory Variable  Estimated Coefficient  P-Value 
CONST  0.360767  0.9816 
IPO  0.463478  0.0473 
TRADE SALE  -1.012117  0.0014 
BUY-BACK  0.007762  0.9672 
EXPANSION  -0.059985  0.7017 
CLOSED  -10.88889  0.3440 
RETHIGH  18.04575  0.3267 
RETMEAN  14.45264  0.2575 
AGE  0.695995  0.1972 
NUMBER  -0.022024  0.5275 
Number of included observations: 47, adjusted R
2 =0.24. 
 
The only two significant variables are IPO (5% level) and TRADE SALE (1% 
level). This supports the theoretical hypothesis that mainly the anticipated agency prob-
lems, stemming from the exit problem, drive the decision whether to use convertible 
securities or traditional debt-equity mixes. If IPOs are the preferred exit channel this 
seems reasonable because, as it is argued by Bascha and Walz (2000), the potential con-
flict of interest between the two parties with respect to the efficient choice of the exit 
mode, can only be solved by the use of a financial instrument that allows both for a 
conditional switch in payoff structures and a contingent allocation of control rights. 
Contrary to that, if the bargaining problems associated with trade sales are expected to 
dominate at the exit stage, the use of convertibles are not really necessary if the venture 
capitalist sells together with the entrepreneur (see Berglöf (1994)). In this case it suf-  29
fices to use a debt/equity mix in order to allocate control rights efficiently between the 
two parties. 
Next, we take a closer look at the two remaining categories in venture capital fi-
nance: equity and silent partnerships. As outlined in the previous section, these instru-
ments are employed by the majority of venture capitalists. For both variables we run the 
same Tobit estimation as for CS before. 
The results are displayed in Table 8 and Table 9. 
 
Table 8: Tobit Estimation for the Percentage of Equity used 
Dependent Variable EQUITY 
Explanatory Variable  Estimated Coefficient  P-Value 
CONST  -12.17049  0.4800 
IPO  0.260096  0.2522 
TRADE SALE  0.070897  0.8129 
BUY-BACK  -0.184656  0.4135 
EXPANSION  0.192387  0.2330 
CLOSED  -3.035397  0.7889 
RETHIGH  17.14406  0.3557 
RETMEAN  40.36616  0.0018 
AGE  -0.419376  0.4653 
NUMBER  -0.039564  0.5291 
Number of observations: 47, adjusted R
2=0.22   30
There are no significant variables other than RETMEAN, indicating that the use 
of equity finance alone is not influenced by our proxies for the severity of agency prob-
lems. Further, the significance of RETMEAN supports the interpretation that pure e q-
uity finance is the most suitable instrument for the financing of average portfolio firms 
showing a normal degree of agency problems. Using equity finance the venture capital-
ist both becomes a residual claimant to the returns of the project, which enhances his 
incentives to provide effort to the project, and receives control and information rights in 
order to monitor the firm. Together with the results from above this confirms the point 
of view that the incentive properties and the complexity of the chosen financial  structure 
varies positively with the anticipated degree of incentive and control problems faced by 
the contracting parties. This relates also to the following results of Table 9. 
There, we aggregate silent partnerships and debt to form the variable 
SILENTDEBT. According to the theory of traditional moral hazard, the use of silent 
partnerships and debt should be most prominent if it suffices to provide the (risk neu-
tral) entrepreneur with the right incentives (Harris/Raviv (1979)). That is on the side of 
the venture capitalist, for a low degree of control and monitoring problems, and a minor 
importance of the exit problem. For example, if the venture capitalist does not aim at an 
IPO, he is not refinanced by a closed-end fund and his return requirement is below mar-
ket average. Additionally, entrepreneurs who aim at a buy-back and are reluctant to sha-
re control over their firm prefer debt-like financing instruments over equity finance. 
Also, with debt finance venture capitalists get a sufficiently hard claim in order to e n-
force their payoff rights in the case of a buy-back.   31
Table 9: Tobit Estimation on the Use of Silent Partnerships and Debt 
Dependent Variable SILENTDEBT 
Explanatory Variable  Estimated Coefficient  P-Value 
CONST  76.84001  0.0000 
IPO  -0.595809  0.0162 
TRADE SALE  -0.122496  0.6757 
BUY-BACK  0.355371  0.0247 
EXPANSION  -0.046739  0.7552 
CLOSED  -41.16246  0.0010 
RETHIGH  -62.61049  0.0038 
RETMEAN  -38.29968  0.0006 
AGE  -0.024771  0.9576 
NUMBER  0.010978  0.7034 
Number of observations: 47, adjusted R
2=0.70 
 
All significant effects are completely in line with theory. Most notably, we find a 
significant and negative effect for initial public offerings and a positive effect of the 
buy-back alternative as exit route on the choice of debt-like financing instruments by 
German venture capitalists. Together with the negative effects of CLOSED, RETHIGH 
and RETMEAN respectively it becomes quite obvious that silent partnerships and debt 
financing is most often used if the venture capitalist does not care much about the incen-
tive and control aspects of the exit problem and not exclusively aims at maximizing the 
returns from investments. In this context one could argue that public-private-partnership 
agencies are traditionally supporting the financing of startups and medium-sized firms 
by publicly guaranteed loans in order to promote regional development. As they do not 
face the same extent of agency problems as private venture capitalists, they are more 
likely to use rather low powered incentive compatible financing instruments such as   32
debt and silent partnerships. The latter instruments seem to have evolved along with the 
tradition of independent entrepreneurs and the handing-over of family-owned busi-
nesses from one generation to the other. The special role played by public-private part-
nerships in the German market might reinforce the constancy of this tradition. 
 
6  Summary 
In this paper we have analyzed some important structures in venture capital finance. Our 
analysis thereby shed some light on the details of the corporate control mechanisms in 
the German venture capital industr. Our survey data have allowed us to explore general 
characteristics of the industry and especially the relative importance of different finan-
cial instruments. Additionally, we were able to test t he broad implications of theoreti-
cally derived hypotheses on the determinants of the financial structures in venture capi-
tal contracts.  
With respect to general characteristics, we have detected that private venture 
capitalists tend to have higher return c laims than public ones. Also private and young 
venture capitalist organize their refunding more often by means of closed-end funds. 
This indicates that with regard to the perceived extend of agency problems there may be 
a significant difference between private venture capitalists and public-private-partner-
ship agencies. The quantitative and qualitative importance of public actors in the Ger-
man market may be one of the causes for the relative low frequency of convertibles and 
the dominance of silent partnerships as financial instruments. It would be interesting to 
see if this influence could also be supported on an European level.   33
Our results with respect to the determinants of the chosen financial structure are 
in line with the theoretical hypotheses derived in the literature. We find that in cases 
when venture capitalists expect a high frequency of IPOs as a exit channel they are 
more inclined to use the more complex and flexible financial securities, especially con-
vertible securities. Higher return claims and the use of closed-end funds make the use of 
these instruments more likely, too. This indicates that the use of convertibles (relative to 
other instruments) is influenced by the severity of agency problems. Accordingly, debt-
like financing instruments l ike silent partnerships tend to be chosen when agency prob-
lems are low and the venture capitalist expects a high frequency of buy-backs.  
Obviously there are many questions we were not able to address with this par-
ticular kind of data. The most important shortcoming is the lack of a detailed data base 
on the level of the individual contractual relationship between the venture capital firm 
and the entrepreneur. Overcoming this problem would allow us to test the various theo-
ries about the choice of the financial structure more directly and is, without doubt, one 
of the main objectives of our future research.   34
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